Norma. Una Proposta di Concettualizzazione per la Sociologia del Diritto e le altre Scienze Sociali

In this volume the author proposes a conceptualization for the term ‘norm’ suitable for sociology of law and other social sciences, including ethology. Norms are conceptualized as (psychical) dispositions to experience normative emotions toward behaviors that are the object of perception or representation. For example, a norm is a customer’s disposition to become angry if they are not given “their” reserved table at a restaurant. To avoid circularity, normative emotions are conceptualized in an extra-normative way as the emotions that either emerge and/or are reshaped by virtue of the interaction of the child with their caregiver and are to be regarded as \’normative\’ insofar as the interaction from which they stem is affected by the fact that the child conceives of their caregiver in the fashion monotheisms conceive of the One God. Special attention is paid to anger – understood as a form of socialized reactive aggression – to which sense of entitlement is traced back. This is why anger is also referred to as the ‘jural’ emotion. The volume also contains a discussion of normative emotions other than jural emotions (or ‘moral’ emotions), such as indignation – understood as socialized proactive aggression –, disgust, guilt, shame, and contempt. In the last chapter, the author shows how ‘ought’, ‘can’, ‘has the right to’ can be empiricized and reformulates Max Weber’s ideal types of social action in the terms of the ideas expounded here.